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Sammendrag 
Dersom verden skal lykkes med et fossilfritt energisystem kreves det store investeringer i fornybar 
energiproduksjon. Den nye produksjonen må fraktes fram til forbrukerne, og det kan bety store 
investeringskostnader i ledningsnettet, også langt unna der kraften mates inn i nettet. Kostnader i 
forbindelse med nødvendige nettforsterkninger bæres ikke fult ut av energiprodusentene. Det kan bety 
at f.eks. vindkraftprodusentene ikke etablerer vindkraftverk der det er samfunnsøkonomisk mest 
lønnsom, men der det er privatøkonomisk mest lønnsomt. De vil da ta mer hensyn til gode vindforhold 
framfor de nødvendige nettinvesteringene. I dette prosjektet har vi sett på politikkinstrumenter for å få 
en samfunnsøkonomisk riktig geografisk fordeling av nye vindkraftverk. Vi har også beregnet 
forskjellen i lokalisering og forskjellen i kostander mellom den privatøkonomiske løsningen og den 
samfunnsøkonomisk beste geografiske plasseringen av nye vindkraftverk i Norge. Våre resultater viser 
at nettforsterkningskostnadene kan bli betydelig høyere når lokaliseringen er basert på 
privatøkonomisk lønnsomhet framfor samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet. Men summen av 
nettforsterkningskostnader og elproduksjonskostnader ble ganske like siden de privatøkonomiske 
lønnsomhetskriteriene ledet til lokalisering på steder med bedre vindforhold, og dermed lavere 
elproduksjonskostnader 
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1. Introduction 
A starting point for our analysis is that increased renewable energy production is one important pillar 
for reaching a low-carbon society. Increased renewable electricity production demands investments in 
grid infrastructure, especially because sources for renewable energy, like wind power and hydro 
power, may be located far from consumer sites. The necessary investment in infrastructure does not 
only depend on the amount of new production capacity, but also on the geographical location of this 
capacity. Within a market based system it is to a large extent up to the electricity producers to 
determine which generation projects they believe may be profitable. The regulatory authorities 
typically decide whether to grant a license for a specific project, but they have a limited role in 
determining which areas market participants choose to locate their projects. In this paper we analyze 
analytically the conditions for an optimal geographical distribution of renewable production capacity, 
and we discuss how this can be implemented in a market economy with a support scheme for 
renewable energy production. Furthermore, we conduct a numerical analysis of the Norwegian energy 
system to illustrate the social cost of ignoring the investments in the grid infrastructure when 
designing policy instruments to induce more renewable energy production.  
 
Several countries have specific targets for renewable energy production, including all EU Member 
States (EU, 2009). The European Union seeks to establish an Energy Union with an ambitious climate 
policy and an integrated EU electricity market open to cross-border trade.1 Moreover, environmental 
acts such as the Renewables Directive 2009/28/EC are of large significance for the electricity market, 
requiring new renewables investments through the setting of binding national renewables targets. 
However, the choice of instruments to achieve the binding national targets have not been harmonised 
at EU level. Moreover, EU law does not at present include harmonised rules for the setting of 
connection tariffs for new electricity generation plants. Member States are therefore free to choose 
different kinds of renewables incentives – such as feed-in, green certificates, tax or tariff schemes – 
provided the schemes are designed in accordance with the more general EU legislation, and the 
designated policy instrument varies across countries, see, among others, Kitzing et al. (2012).  
                                                     
1 Legislation at both primary Treaty level (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and secondary 
legislation level are key instruments to achieve these goals. This EU energy acquis is also, as a point of departure, EEA 
(European Economic Area) relevant, and is or will become part of the EEA Agreement. The energy specific secondary 
legislation includes a comprehensive set of substantive and institutional requirements aimed at promoting a sustainable, 
secure and competitive EU Internal Electricity Market. These provisions are included, inter alia, in the Third Energy Package 
comprising (for electricity) the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC, the Electricity Regulation (EC) No. 714/2009 and the 
Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 establishing the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).  
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Furthermore, according to Kitzing et al. (2012), the support for new renewable energy production 
among EU member states is, in general, not site specific (but does vary across technologies and size). 
Capacity location may matter significantly for the social cost of the transformation of the energy 
sector. Location matters for both emission reductions, impact on landscape and transmission 
congestions, see Hitaj (2015) and Zografos and Martinez-Alier (2009). In this paper we concentrate 
attention on grid costs. A radical increase in renewable energy production may demand substantial 
investments in increased transmission and distribution capacity. Whether the market system leads to a 
socially efficient geographical distribution of production capacity depends inter alia on the design of 
grid connection charges. The literature distinguishes between so-called deep and shallow connection 
charges, see, i.e., Turvey (2006). Deep connection charges reflect all of the estimated cost of 
accommodating additional generation. With shallow connection charges the producers only pay for the 
local investment required to connect capacity to the grid, and not the incremental investment that has 
to be made in the wider transportation system. Shallow connection charges lead to inefficient location. 
Although deep connection charges can ensure optimal location of energy production capacity, it raises 
new question concerning how the cost of reinforcement of the wider energy system is to be shared 
among new and existing users. This is especially relevant for lumpy connection investments; see 
discussion in Turvey (2006). Although the discussion on shallow versus deep connection charges is 
not new, the problem of inefficient location may become increasingly severe due to the greening of the 
energy sector and the subsequent need for grid enforcements.  
 
In the next section, we present an analytical model to derive the conditions for an optimal 
geographical distribution of new renewable energy production, taking into account the warranted grid 
investments. The model is very simple, but rich enough to capture some of the main characteristics of 
an electricity market with price zones (bidding areas).2 We show how a market-based solution with 
shallow connection charges and uniform feed-in premiums (subsidies) to green energy production 
leads to socially inefficient location. Furthermore, we show how differentiated (non-uniform) feed-in 
premiums can yield socially optimal location. We restrict our analysis to the potential inefficiency 
following from the geographical distribution of new production capacity, ignoring any potential 
inefficiencies following from the behavior of the regulated grid owners; see discussion in Brunekreeft 
(2004). For analyses of merchant transmission investment as an alternative to investment by regulated 
transmission system operators, see, i.e., Chao and Peck (1996), Bushnell and Stoft (1997) and Joskow 
and Tirole (2005).  
                                                     
2 Zonal pricing has a uniform market price inside a price zone and is adopted by most European countries. See Bjørndal and 
Jørnsten (2001) for a critical analysis of zonal pricing. 
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In Section 3 we present results from a numerical model for the Norwegian energy system to illustrate 
the potential social cost of a socially non-optimal location of wind power capacities. Our starting point 
for the numerical exercise is a political goal to increase the production of wind power (a renewable 
target). We compare the outcome of a market-based allocation mechanism with a first-best outcome, 
that is, a geographical distribution of wind production capacities that minimizes the energy system 
cost (given the renewable target). Our result indicate that the total energy system cost of a 5 TWh 
increase in wind power production following from uniform feed-in premiums was modestly (6%) 
more costly than a first-best outcome. However, the location of capacities deviates substantially 
between the two regimes, leading to around 50 % higher grid investment costs under a market-based 
allocation mechanism compared with the socially optimal distribution.  
2. Analytical model  
For illustrative purposes, we consider a simple electric power network with two price zones, A and B. 
There are three production nodes and two consumption nodes, as shown in Figure 1. Nodes 1, 2 and 3 
are potential supply nodes for new wind parks, whereas nodes 4 and 5 are consumption nodes. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assume that one unit capacity produces the same amount of energy in all 
production locations.3 Our numerical model has a detailed description of the entire energy system, see 
section 3.2. 
 
Figure 1. Electric power network 
 
                                                     
3 This is obviously a simplification. The capacity factor (output as a proportion of maximum capacity) of a wind turbine is 
dependent on its geographical location. It is often assumed to be 30–35%, but Boccard (2009) finds that the realized average 
European capacity factor over the last five years is less than 21%. We could have introduced different conversion factors to 
transfer capacity to energy in the various production zones. However, that would not change the qualitative results from the 
analytical model.  
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Let 1q , 2q and 3q  denote the wind production capacity installed, measured in MWs, at nodes 1, 2 and 
3, respectively. The locations differ regarding investment cost. Let 1 1( )c q and 2 2( )c q  and 3 3( )c q
denote the cost functions, which are all assumed to be increasing and non-concave; in particular, 
( )i ic q′ >0 and ( ) 0i ic q′′ ≥  for all i =1,2,3.4 Furthermore, we assume that it is less costly to install 
capacity at node 1 than at node 2 for all levels of capacity, that is, 1 1 2 2( ) ( )c q c q<  for all 1 2q q= . The 
capacity costs include inter alia the producer’s annualized cost of providing for grid infrastructure 
from the production facility to the grid connection point (radial grids), see the discussion in section 3.1 
on investment contributions.  
 
We denote by ijT  the physical power flow capacity between the two connected nodes i and j. The grid 
capacity can be expanded by investments, either in new transmission and/or distribution infrastructure 
or upgrading the existing network (see Joskow, 2005 for list of projects to enhance transmission 
networks):  
(1) 0ij ij ijT T I= +  , 
where 0ijT is the initial transmission capacity and ijI denotes new transmission capacity in line (ij), all 
measured in MW. Although all investment projects are typically lumpy, we simplify the model by 
treating new transmission capacity as a divisible investment project, and there are convex costs 
attached to adjusting the transmission capacities. (The lumpy characteristics of grid investments are 
taken into account in the numerical model, see section 3.2).  
  
The transmission lines between the nodes in price zone A have identical characteristics, and thereby 
line impedances, and we ignore any transmission losses. As it is less costly to increase the capacity at 
node 1 than at node 2, the pressure on the transmission capacity typically comes from the production 
at node 1. According to Kirchoff’s law, we have the following constraint for the power flow on the 
line between node 1 and 2:5  
(2) 01 2 12 12
1 1 .
3 3
q q T I− ≤ +  
                                                     
4 We use one apostrophe to denote the first derivative and two apostrophes to denote the second derivative. 
5 Electricity moves according to Kirchoff’s law, following the path of least resistance. The constraint follows from the 
symmetric structure of our network model (identical characteristics of the transmission lines).  
8 
To simplify, we ignore the other physical transmission constraints within zone A  by assuming that 
they will always be nonbinding, also in the absence of new investments. The cost of new transmission 
capacity between node 1 and 2 is given by 12( )k I , where 0k′ > . 
 
The transmission capacity between node 3 and 5 can also be expanded by investments, either in new 
transmission lines or upgrading the existing network.  
(3) 03 35 35.q T I≤ +  
The cost of building new transmission capacity in prize zone B is an increasing function of the new 
transmission capacity between node 3 and 5, given by 35(I )d , where 0d ′ > .  
 
We assume that the flow on the high voltage transmission capacity between price zone A and B goes 
in the direction from B to A, such that the relevant transmission constraint is  
(4) 01 2( )CA AB ABq q q T I− + ≤ + ,  
where , ,Ckq k A B= denote consumption in price zone k. The cost of building new transmission 
capacity between A and B is an increasing function of the new transmission capacity between A and 
B, given by ( )ABz I , where 0z′ > .  
 
Consumption equals production:  
(5) 1 2 3
CA CBq q q q q+ = + +  
2.1. Socially optimal capacity localization 
The social welfare generated from electricity consumption (W) is the benefit from consuming 
electricity, expressed by the utility functions ( )CAAU q and ( )
CB
BU q   
 
( 0, 0, , )k kU U k A B′ ′′> < = , less of the production and transmission cost. We assume that the 
regulator wants to stimulate production of new renewable energy. The regulator’s objective function is 
to maximize social welfare, given Rq  units of new wind energy.  
(6) 1 2 3
Rq q q q= + +  
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This leads to the following objective function:  
 1 1 2 2 3 3 12 35Max (q ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
CA CB
A B ABW U U q c q c q c q k I d I z I = + − + + + + +    (7) 
subject to (2)-(5). 
 
See Appendix A for the derivation of the first order conditions. The solution depends on whether the 
transmission constraints are binding or not. 
Non-binding transmission constraints 
When the transmission constraints are non-binding we find the following optimality conditions (see 
Appendix A): 
(8) 1 2 3
1 2 3( ) 0,
A B
A A B R
U U
c c c
c U c U c U λ
′ ′=
′ ′ ′= =
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− = − = − = >
  
where Rλ is the shadow cost of the renewable constraint.  
 
Proposition 1. In the case of non-binding transmission constraints:  
• The optimal distribution of consumption is such that the marginal benefit of consumption is 
equalized across prize zones  
• The optimal distribution of renewable production capacities is such that the marginal cost of 
production capacities should be equalized across all production nodes.  
• Due to the renewable constraint, marginal cost of production exceeds the marginal benefit 
from consumption. The difference is equalized across all production zones. 
Proof: Proposition 1 follows from the first-order conditions and a binding renewable target (
0Rλ > ).  
Binding transmission constraints 
When the transmission constraints are binding in optimum, we find the following optimality 
conditions for the distribution of production capacities and investments in transmission lines (see 
Appendix A): 
(9) 1 2 3
1 1
3 3
A B
c k c k c d z
U U z
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ = − = + +
′ ′ ′= +
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This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: With binding transmission constraints: 
• The marginal cost of production capacities including the marginal cost of the (optimal) in-
vestments that have to be made to accommodate the new generation capacity, should be 
equalized across production nodes.  
• The marginal utility of consumption less the marginal cost of transmission between price 
zones, should be equalized across price zones. 
 
Proof: Proposition 2 follows from the first-order conditions (see Appendix A). 
 
From proposition 2, we can immediately derive the following corollary:  
Corollary 1. With binding transmission constraints: 
• The marginal cost of optimal production capacity will differ within price zones and across 
price zones.  
• The marginal utility of optimal consumption will differ across price zones.  
2.2. Profit maximizing behavior 
We now consider a system with shallow connection charges; that is, energy producers do not face the 
full transmission costs of accommodating their additional generation capacity, 12 35( , , )ABI I I . Let 
Ap  
and Bp denote energy prices in zone A and B, respectively. We assume that the producers and the 
TSO are price-takers. Furthermore let iF  denote the feed-in premium for renewables at production 
node i. The profits of the producers at node 1, node 2 and node 3 are given by, respectively,
1 1 1 1( ) ( )
Ap F q c q+ ⋅ − , 2 2 2 2( ) ( )
Ap F q c q+ ⋅ −  and 3 3 3 3( ) ( )
Bp F q c q+ ⋅ − .  
 
Profit-maximizing behavior leads to the following first order conditions:  
(10) 
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
( )
( )
( )
A
A
B
c q p F
c q p F
c q p F
′ = +
′ = +
′ = +
  
The consumers maximize their welfare, given by ( ) , ,i Ci iU q p i A B− = , leading to the following 
first order conditions: 
(11) 
( )
( )
CA A
A
CB B
B
U q p
U q p
′ =
′ =
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Throughout the analysis we assume that the transmission system operator (TSO) and/or distribution 
system operators (DSOs) invest in the local grid to accommodate new generation capacities within 
each price zone, and optimize profit when it comes to investments in the high voltage grid between 
price zones.  
 
The TSO’s profit ( GΠ ) from the high voltage grid is the income from selling in the high price zone 
and buying in the low price zone, less of the investment costs. The amount of trade is restricted by the 
transmission capacity, 0AB ABT I+ :  
(12) 0( ) ( ) ( )G A B AB AB ABp p T I z IΠ = − ⋅ + −   
Maximizing GΠ with respect to ABI gives the following first-order condition: 
(13) A Bp p z′− =   
From (10), (11) and (13), we can write the capacities and trade between A and B as functions of the 
prices and feed-in premium. The equilibrium prices, as functions of the feed-in premium, are found 
from the market equilibrium conditions:  
(14) 1 1 2 2
3 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
A A AB A B CA A
B AB A B CB B
q p F q p F I p p q p
q p F I p p q p
+ + + + − =
+ − − =
  
Optimal feed-in premiums 
We define optimal feed-in premiums as the premiums that ensure that producers locate their 
production according to the socially optimal location. In the case of a non-binding transmission 
constraints, this is characterized by (5), (6) and (8), and 12 35 0ABI I I= = = . We see from (10) and 
(11) that the following feed-in premiums gives the optimal production capacities identified in (8): 
 
 * * * * * * *1 1 2 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1, 2, 3
CA CA CB
i A A B RF c q U q c q U q c q U q iλ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − = − = − = =   (15) 
 
Proposition 3: With no binding transmission constraints, the optimal feed-in premium should be 
equalized across all production nodes and set equal to the shadow cost of the renewable constraint (in 
optimum).  
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For binding transmission constraints, the optimal localization is characterized by (5), (6) and (9). We 
see from (10) and (11) that the following feed-in premiums give the optimal production capacities 
identified in (9): 
(16) 
** ** **
1 1 1
** ** **
2 2 2
** ** **
3 3 3
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
CA
A
CA
A
CB
B
F c q U q
F c q U q
F c q U q
′ ′= −
′ ′= −
′ ′= −
  
Furthermore, we see from the first order conditions (Appendix A) that: 
(16) 
** ** ** **
1 1 12
** ** ** **
2 2 12
** ** ** **
3 3 35
1( ) ( ) ( )
3
1( ) ( ) ( )
3
( ) ( ) ( )
CA
A R
CA
A R
CB
B R
c q U q k I
c q U q k I
c q U q d I
λ
λ
λ
′ ′ ′− = −
′ ′ ′− = +
′ ′ ′− = −
  
 
Proposition 4: With binding transmission constraints, the feed-in premiums should differ across 
production nodes. 
 
We see from the right hand side of (17) that the optimal feed-in premiums can be expressed by shadow 
costs of the optimizing problem. The first term represents the shadow cost of the renewable constraint 
and is identical for all locations.  
 
The second term represents the transmission costs associated with increased capacity. The second term 
will in general differ across production nodes, and correspond to optimal deep connections charges. 
(See discussion in the introduction).  
 
The following proposition follows directly from the right hand side of (17): 
 
Proposition 5: Let the production nodes be ranked according to their marginal transmission costs 
associated with increased capacity. The higher transmission costs, the lower feed-in premiums. 
  
Note that the feed-in premiums should not be adjusted for the marginal transmission cost between 
zone A and B. The reason is that this transmission cost is reflected in the price difference between the 
zones, when the TSO optimizes the investment, see (13). However, within a price zone, the 
transmission cost is not properly internalized by the producers, as they all face the same price for their 
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production capacity, regardless of their impact on the need for new grid capacities. If there is only one 
node within a price zone, this problem obviously disappears:  
Proposition 6: With optimal nodal pricing, the feed in-premiums should be equalized across nodes, 
also in the case of binding transmission constraints. 
 
Proof: Let 1 2,p p and 3p  denote the producer prices in the production nodes. Taking into account the 
transmission costs associated with increased production capacities, and transmission costs from node 4 
to node 5, we get the following optimal differences in prices:  
1 2 3
1 1, , ,
3 3
A A B A Bp p k p p k p p d p p z′ ′ ′ ′= − = + = − = + . Given these price differences, an 
identical feed-in premium (equal to **Rλ ) for all profit maximizing producers will yield an outcome 
which satisfies (9). 
2.3. Optimal versus suboptimal feed-in premiums  
In the case of binding transmission constraints and socially optimal (“opt”) feed-in premiums, (16), the 
social welfare is given by  
(17) 
** **
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
1 1 3 2 3 3 12 1 2 35 3
(q ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( , )) ( ( )) ( (q , ))
opt CA CB
A B
CA CB
AB
W U U q
c q c q c q k I q q d I q z I q
= +
 − + + + + + 
  
Consider the case where all producers get the same feed-in premium, sufficiently large to fulfill the 
same renewable outcome as in (18), given that the TSO and/or DSOs accommodate new generation 
capacities within each price zone, and optimize profit when it comes to investments in the high voltage 
grid between price zones, see (13). Hence, the equilibrium outcome satisfies (10) ,(11) and (13) for 
1 2 3F F F= = . Let the outcomes be denoted with bars. The social welfare of this profit maximizing 
(“PM”) system is  
(18) 
1 1 3 3 3 3 12 1 2 35 3
(q ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( , )) ( ( )) ( ( , ))
PM A CA B CB
CA CB
AB
W U U q
c q c q c q k I q q d I q z I q q
= +
 − + + + + + 
  
 
Note that in the case of non-binding transmission constraints, opt PMW W= . However, when it is 
optimal to differentiate the feed-in premiums, due to the transmission constraints, the location of 
production capacities and the investment in the grid will differ between (18) and (19), and 
opt PMW W> . Identical feed-in premiums across locations will in that case lead to too large 
14 
production capacities in nodes where the accommodating investment costs are large (relatively to the 
profit from electricity production).  
In the next section we illustrate numerically how uniform versus non-uniform feed-in premiums can 
affect the location of new wind-power plants, grid investments and social welfare (measured in energy 
system cost of meeting an exogenous demand for energy services).  
3. Numerical illustration  
Norway has implemented EUs Renewables Directive and has, together with Sweden, a joint target for 
new renewable energy by 2020. Norway and Sweden have a joint green certificate market (GCM) for 
new renewable energy, see The Swedish Energy Agency and the Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate (2013). As shown in Aune et al. (2012), in the case of no uncertainty and market 
power, cf. von der Fehr and Ropenus, 2017, a green certificate system can be designed to yield the 
same outcome as feed-in tariffs or feed-in premiums. In the following we use a numerical model to 
illustrate the potential social cost of uniform versus non-uniform feed-in premiums, given a target of 
5TWh increased wind production. An increase of 5TWh is in line with the literature on expected new 
wind power production in Norway, given the Norwegian-Swedish renewable target. Lind and 
Rosenberg (2014) obtained a production increase of around 4.5 TWh from wind power when 
analyzing how various risk factors could influence the green certificate market of Norway and 
Sweden. In a work by Bøeng (2010), a production increase of 6 TWh from wind power is assumed 
when analyzing the consequences of the renewable energy directive. By October 2016, only 0.4 TWh 
of new wind power production in Norway contributes to the joint target of 28.4 TWh of new 
renewable energy production by the end 2020. However, wind-power facilities expected to produce 
approximately 3.3 TWh is currently under construction in Norway (NVE, 2016a). In 2016, the annual 
Norwegian wind-power production was 2.1 TWh (Weid, 2017), with an installed capacity of 873 MW. 
This corresponded roughly to 1.4% of the total national power production that year. 
 
For both Norway and Sweden, the expected renewable production increase can lead to challenges for 
the electricity transmission grid. For several of the price areas in the Nordic spot market, the existing 
transmission grid has limited capacity for new power projects. Both countries have extensive plans for 
expanding and strengthening grids, but the relevant projects will depend on various investment 
decisions related to renewable power technologies. Furthermore, the investments must be within the 
grid regulations.  
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3.1. Grid regulations 
In Norway, the connection of new electricity generation plants to the grid must follow Norwegian 
requirements governed by the Energy Act with appurtenant regulations. Section 3-4 of the Energy Act 
requires grid companies to connect to new electricity production and consumption units and to carry 
out the necessary investments in their grid. This provision was introduced with effect from 1 January 
2010 as a tool to facilitate better coordination between grid, production and consumption behaviour 
(Ot. prp. nr. 62 (2008-2009), p. 25).6 
 
The connection requirement applies for all grid companies, including the TSO Statnett, and for all the 
necessary grid investments from the connection point and up to and including the transmission grid. It 
is, however, still the electricity producer’s responsibility to provide for grid infrastructure from the 
production facility to the grid connection point identified by the grid company (Ot. prp. nr. 62 (2008-
2009), p. 34). 
 
The grid company may be granted an exemption from the connection and investment obligation if the 
production and grid investments taken together are not considered so-called “socio-economic 
profitable”. The assessment of socio-economic profitability will primarily be made by comparing the 
total income from both the production and grid facilities with the total cost from the same facilities.7  
 
Neither Section 3-4 of the Energy Act nor Section 3-4 of the Energy Regulation set forth any rules 
governing the distribution of costs for grid investments carried out by the grid company as part of the 
connection obligation. Section 17-5 of the Control Regulation sets forth that the grid companies may 
stipulate an investment contribution (“anleggsbidrag”) in order to cover investment costs for new grid 
connections, or cover the costs for grid reinforcements to existing customers where the customers 
require increased capacity.8 Investment contributions for new grid connections may, however, at the 
outset only be required for radial grids, as these grids will have a specific customer group, for example 
a new electricity producer. For meshed grids, investment contributions may only be required in 
extraordinary cases. 
 
In cases where investment contributions may be required, the grid company shall determine the 
amount irrespective of the customer’s estimated energy off take and the maximum cost may be set to 
                                                     
6 The provision is supplemented by the Energy Regulation 7 December 1990 No. 959 Section 3-4. 
7 In cases where several production or grid facilities must be established, all facilities must be assessed together (Ot. prp. nr. 
62 (2008-2009), pp. 3-4). The right of exemption is analysed in detail by Bjerke (2013), pp. 69-115. 
8 Regulation 11 March 1999 No. 302. 
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investment cost less connection charge. The latter right to a connection charge is further regulated in 
Section 17-4 of the Control Regulation. The investment contribution shall be estimated based on the 
costs arising due to the customer’s connection to the grid. If the connection requires reinforcement of a 
joint radial grid with several users, a proportionate share of the cost may be comprised by the 
investment contribution. The grid company may also distribute the investment contribution between 
customers connected to the grid at the time of completion and customers that will be connected to the 
grid at a later stage within the next 10 years after completion. 
 
When the new grid facilities become operational, the question arises how the costs for running the grid 
shall be distributed between the grid company’s customers. If the new grid is defined as an ordinary 
grid facility, i.e. distribution or transmission grid, the grid income will fall under the grid company’s 
income frame and tariff costs will be distributed among all grid users. However, if the new grid has as 
its main function to transport electricity from the connected electricity production facility to the closest 
exchange point in the grid, it qualifies as a production related grid facility. The tariff costs for such 
production related grid facilities shall be covered by the electricity producer in question, and not be 
distributed among all grid company customers.9 The relevant costs for new grid facilities are also 
included in the numerical illustration presented below. If the new grid’s main function is to transport 
electricity to the closest exchange point in the grid, the costs are covered by each individual wind 
power plant (i.e. power producers). Otherwise, the costs are covered by the local grid company, as 
indicated by the various transmission lines in figure 3.  
3.2. Modelling Framework 
TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System) is a model generator developed as a part of the 
IEA-ETSAP (Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program), ETSAP (2017). The TIMES model 
generator combines two different systematic approaches to energy system modelling, including a 
technical engineering approach and an economic approach. A TIMES model gives a detailed 
description of the entire energy system including all resources, energy production technologies, energy 
carriers, demand devices, and sectorial demand for energy services. The model assumes perfect 
competition and perfect foresight (can also be used in a myopic mode) and is demand driven. Thus, 
the projected energy demand has to be given exogenously to the model, and the TIMES model 
establishes the least cost way of supplying energy services by making equipment decisions, as well as 
operating, primary energy supply and energy trade decisions.  
                                                     
9 See Section 17-1 of the Control Regulation. See also Section 17-1 second paragraph on the distribution of costs in cases of 
other offtake directly from the production related grid facility. 
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A modified version of TIMES-Norway (Lind et.al., 2013; Rosenberg and Lind, 2014) is used to 
analyze the optimal location of new wind power plants based on various transmission grid 
assumptions (see below). The potential for new onshore wind facilities in the TIMES model is based 
on information from the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). NVE reports 
information on all wind power plants that have either applied for a license or been approved. In order 
to ensure socio-economic profitability, we have only included wind power plants with a license in our 
numerical simulations, see discussion in section 3.1.10 Based on the information in the licensing 
database (NVE, 2016b), each plants’ respective investment and operating costs are included, along 
with associated capacity factors. Investment costs also include the investment contribution to new 
radial grids (“anleggsbidrag”), as discussed in section 3.1. 11 As a part of the transmission network 
tariffs a locational charge for marginal losses to all users of the system is applied. This term is 
calculated individually for each separate input point and determined based on marginal network losses 
in the network system as a whole. Note that this location charge only takes into account marginal 
losses in the transportation of electricity and not the investment costs associated with expansions of 
the meshed grids.  
 
The base year of the model is 2010 and the model horizon is to 2050, which again is divided into 
periods of five years. Each period contains 12 two-hour steps for a representative day of four different 
seasons. Stochastic modelling of short-term uncertainties in e.g. energy service demand or power 
prices can be used in the model to reduce the disadvantages with a deterministic approach. Such an 
analysis is not done in this paper, since the purpose here is to analyze an optimal coordinated 
development of the entire electricity system compared to a private profitability solution. 
Geographically, the model covers Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and is divided into 11 model 
regions (see Figure 2) based on the pricing areas in the Nordic spot market for electricity (Nord Pool 
Spot, 2015; Statnett, 2017). As seen in the figure below, Norway is divided into five market areas for 
electricity. This is based on the regulations of the Energy Act, where it is stated that the system 
operating grid companies are responsible for dividing the various countries into elspot areas in order to 
handle large and prolonged bottlenecks in the regional and central grid. In addition, the power and 
market situation of each of these areas will determine the direction of the power flows between the 
elspot areas. In the TIMES model, there is exchange of electricity between regions and neighboring 
countries, and the transmission capacity within and outside Scandinavia is given exogenously and is 
                                                     
10 Only projects which are considered socio-economic profitable will be granted a construction license pursuant to Section 3-
1 of the Energy Act, see further the objectives set out in Section 1-2 of the Act. 
11 See Section 17-5 of the Control Regulation. 
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based on current capacity. In addition, there are no further investment options in new transmission 
capacity between the three countries; however capacity expansion projects to Europe are included as 
endogenous investment options.  
Figure 2: Illustration of the Scandinavian Nord Pool price areas with external trade to Europe. 
 
 
Transmission grid modelling 
As described in section 2, investments in new wind power production capacity may necessitate grid 
reinforcements. Indeed, several of the potential new power projects in Norway will require 
investments in the transmission grid. In order to incorporate this feature in the TIMES model, integer 
variables are included to describe whether or not a grid investment is made. As indicated in Figure 3, 
several wind power projects can use the same transmission line if built, whereas none of the projects 
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can be completed if the opposite happens. If e.g. transmission line A is constructed in a social optimal 
scenario, it is most likely that the majority of the wind power projects connected to this line will be 
built before another transmission line is constructed. The same applies to transmission line B and C. 
Additionally, some projects are not in need of a new transmission line, and can be connected directly 
to the existing HV-grid.  
 
Figure 3: Intersection between wind power and transmission grid projects 
 
 
Energy End Use Demand 
The demand for various energy services are supplied exogenously to the model. The TIMES model is 
used to analyse the consumption of energy carriers and to investigate the substitution effect with 
technology shifts. In this work, the same methodology as in Rosenberg et al. (2013) is used for 
calculating the energy end use demand, where the calculations are based on the development of drivers 
and indicators of each demand sector. More specific details regarding the demand projection can be 
found in Rosenberg et al. (2015). It should be noted that flexible demand could be an economical and 
technical alternative in preference to grid investments. However, this work focuses solely on optimal 
location of renewable power, and any measures on the supply side of the energy system is not covered 
here.  
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3.3. Scenario Assumptions 
Unless otherwise noted, the analyses in this paper take account of all active national policy measures 
with direct relevance to the electricity market. However, instead of the joint green certificate market 
with Sweden, we consider a domestic feed-in premium scheme for new renewables. The energy taxes 
are kept constant at the 2014 level until 2050, including value added tax (VAT), nonrecurring  charge 
for new vehicles, fuel tax for road transport, tax on electricity consumption, and various CO2 taxes.  
 
Energy Prices 
Energy prices for imported energy carriers are taken from Energinet.dk (2015). The prices of 
electricity import/export to and from Scandinavia are given exogenously and kept constant at the 2014 
level throughout the analyses. In addition, the various price profiles for each of the time-slices are 
calculated based on historical prices. It should be noted that electricity prices in the Scandinavian 
regions are endogenous, represented by the dual values of the electricity balance equation.  
 
Scenarios 
Socially optimal scenario (opt): As a starting point, we added a restriction to the TIMES model 
requiring 5 TWh of new wind power production in Norway by 2020. As discussed above, this 
assumption is motivated by a likely production increase in Norway due to the green certificate market. 
For the opt scenario, we find the welfare optimizing combination of locations of new capacities and 
grid investments by minimizing energy system cost, including the costs of necessary investments in 
the transmission grid. The outcome of this scenario corresponds to (18) in the analytical model.  
 
Profit max scenario (PM): The same restriction regarding production increase is added in this case as 
well. In the PM scenario, the wind power producers act as if they received a uniform feed-in premium, 
sufficiently high to incentivize 5 TWh of new wind power. The producers find the locations for their 
wind farms that maximize their profit, given that the TSO invests in grids to accommodate their 
capacity into the energy system, as described in 2.2. Technically this is modeled in TIMES by first 
finding the least cost locations of wind farms, ignoring the costs of necessary transmission upgrades 
within each price zone. Thereafter, we find the necessary investments in transmission grids within 
each price zones to accommodate the new capacities. Upgrades of the high-voltage inter zones 
transmission lines are assumed to be implemented if profitable, given the new capacities and zonal 
transmission grids. The welfare of this scenario corresponds to (20) in the analytical model.  
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For all of the scenarios, TIMES finds the total cost of providing the electricity demanded. We compare 
the system cost of the Profit max scenario with the system cost of the socially optimal scenario, where 
the difference is the social cost of an inefficient geographical distribution of wind parks. Additionally, 
we identify the cost of transmission network investments for each location. 
 
We also present a Business as usual scenario (bau). The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate the 
effects of the policies analyzed in the other scenarios. 
 
Sensitivity analyses of the three main scenarios were also conducted. Here, Kirchhoff’s laws are 
incorporated by including a DC power flow linearization of an AC power flow, as well as simplified 
N-1 security constraints. Clearly, the actual grid is much more detailed than the aggregated network 
included in the TIMES model. It is therefore too strict to assume that the grid behaves as according to 
Kirchhoff’s voltage law. However, it is also imprecise to assume that the law does not apply. Results 
from the sensitivity analysis are presented in the appendix.  
3.4. Results 
Figure 4 illustrates the new wind power production in 2020 for the three main scenarios. As shown, 
the model results vary considerably for three of the price areas depending on how the transmission 
grid investment costs are included. For the Profit max scenario, it is optimal that the production 
increase is largest in NO3. Currently, this region is a net importer of energy, so increasing the local 
production will decrease the dependency of imports from other regions. The production increase is 
second largest in NO2, which is the southernmost price area in Norway. This area is strongly 
connected to Europe through cables. There is also a considerable production increase in the 
northernmost price area (NO4). This is largely due to the high capacity factors (i.e. better wind 
conditions) experienced in this area.  
 
The Socially optimal scenario illustrates the optimal location of new wind farms when all necessary 
investments related to grid expansion are taken into consideration. Compared to PM, the production 
increase is now even larger in NO3. This is mainly due to the fact that the PM scenario will not be 
optimal when adding the costs of network development. It will require significant grid investments to 
export the additional electricity out of NO4, which means that it is more cost effective to take both 
power and grid investments in NO3. As a consequence, the production increase is now lowest in NO4.  
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Figure 4: New wind power production in 2020 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates total power production costs for the new wind farms and the total costs related to 
the grid expansion (related to both transmission and distribution). The grid costs are around 55 % 
higher for the Profit max scenario, primarily due to higher necessary investments in transmission grids 
within each price zone to accommodate the new capacities. However, power production costs are 
roughly 8% lower. In total, achieving the target of 5 TWh of new wind power is only 6% more costly 
under a system with uniform feed-in premiums (Profit max) than under a system with optimal 
localization of new wind farms (as would follow from optimally differentiated feed-in-premiums, the 
Social optimal scenario). 12 Hence, policies to minimize the system costs of new wind power have 
significant impact on the geographical distribution of wind farms, but significantly less impact on the 
total energy system cost.  
 
  
                                                     
12 Note that we have limited the analysis to include only those wind power plants with a license. In a model-run where we 
expanded the feasible region by also including wind power projects that have applied for a license, the difference was much 
larger. 
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Figure 5: Power and transmission grid costs 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the investment costs for transmission grid upgrades per region for the two main 
scenarios. As seen, the investments vary considerably for NO4 depending on the wind power 
production in this region. A positive change in production of 0.7 TWh in NO3 (going from PM to opt) 
gives an increased transmission cost of around 200 MNOK, whereas a decreased production of 0.8 
TWh in NO4 results in cost savings of around 2 400 MNOK for this model region. Otherwise, the 
necessary grid investments do not vary significantly for the other three model regions. It is interesting 
to note that the grid investment costs are almost similar for the Social optimal and the Profit max 
scenarios for region NO3, although there is a difference in power production of around 0.7 TWh. This 
clearly demonstrates that the same grid connection(s) can be used for several wind power projects, just 
as described in Figure 3.  
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Figure 6: Investment costs per region  
 
4. Conclusions and discussion 
Increased renewable energy production requires new investments in the grid. However, the magnitude 
of the necessary investments depends, inter alia, on where the new production plants are located. In 
this paper we have analyzed how a subsidy scheme (feed-in premiums) can be designed to induce a 
socially optimal location of new wind power capacities, given the subsequent investments in grids to 
accommodate the new capacities to the energy system. The optimal non-uniform feed-in premiums are 
differentiated across locations. The optimal feed-in premiums correspond to a system with optimal 
connection charges combined with a uniform subsidy to wind power. Hence, implementing a system 
with differentiated feed-in premiums faces some of the same challenges as implementing a system 
with geographically differentiated deep connection charges. A large increase in renewables, and 
thereby grid investments, calls for an investigation of the current regulations to see whether it might be 
reasonable to allow for some kind of differentiated feed-in premiums, or connection charges which 
reflects the grid investments costs. Such solutions must be assessed further under EU/EEA law, in 
particular State aid law, as well as from the perspective of regulatory design, where the question arises 
how such scheme may be drafted with sufficient precision. 
 
Our numerical illustration indicates that for an increase in new wind power of 5 TWh, the total cost of 
an uncoordinated location (the Profit max) was modestly (5%) higher than a coordinated development 
(social optimum). However, the location of new capacities and thereby grid investments differed 
substantially. The Profit max scenario demanded 55% more grid investments. In this paper we have 
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not considered any of the environmental costs associated with wind parks and new grids. Including 
environmental cost may lead to another optimal geographical distribution of new wind power parks. 
This will be the topic of further research.  
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we find the first order conditions for the optimizing problem given by  
(7) and (2)-(5). 
 
We solve the optimizing problem by first forming the Lagrangian:  
(18) 
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where Rλ  is the shadow cost of the renewable constraint, TAλ is the shadow cost of the transmission 
constraint within price zone A, Mλ is the shadow cost of the market equilibrium constraint, TABλ is the 
shadow cost of the transmission constraint between prize zone A and B and TBλ  is the shadow cost of 
the transmission constraint in price zone B.  
 
We find the following first order conditions (The Kuhn-Tucker conditions), after some 
rearrangements:  
(18)  
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Non-binding transmission constraints implies that 01 2 12
1 1
3 3
q q T− <  , 01 2( )
CA
ABq q q T− + < ,and 
0
3 35q T<  such that 0TA TB TABλ λ λ= = =  and 12 35 0ABI I I= = = .  
 
Let * ( 1, 2,3)iq i =  , 
*CAq , *CBq , * ( , , , , )g g R TA TB TAB Mλ = , *12I  , *35I  and 
*
ABI  denote the solution 
to (19) when the transmission constraints are non-binding. 
 
Let ** ( 1, 2,3)iq i = , 
** ( , , , , )g g R TA TB TAB Mλ = ,
**CAq , **CBq , **12I  , **35I  and 
**
ABI  denote the solution 
to (19) when the transmission constraints are binding. 
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Appendix B 
This section presents some of the results from the sensitivity analysis described in section 3.3. Figure 7 
illustrates the new wind power production per region in 2020 for the opt and PM scenarios, 
respectively. The results are presented with and without the Kirchhoff’s voltage law imposed on the 
grid. Generally, when the voltage law is imposed, the geographical location in the grid becomes more 
important. This can to some extent be seen in figure 7. It is now harder to transmit electricity from the 
two northernmost regions (NO3 and NO4). Instead, more projects are developed in NO2, which is 
highly connected to Europe.  
 
Figure 7: New wind power production in 2020  
 
 
As seen in figure 8, much of the production increase is exported from Norway. Export volumes are 
also increased when the Kirchhoff’s voltage law is imposed on the grid. The reason is that the grid 
becomes less flexible and network capacities are therefore more difficult to use. Another consequence 
is that more expensive wind power projects are built.  
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Figure 8: Net power export in 2020 per scenario 
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